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Abstract: 
The outbreak of the Greek crisis has revived the literature on the sovereign debt spreads. 
Recent evidence has shed new lights on the main determinants of interest rates spreads. The 
sharp increase of government bond yields cannot be entirely attributed to changes in 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Contagion effects can occur and self-fulfilling speculation may 
arise. Yet, this literature has been mainly empirical and needs sound theoretical foundations. 
The aim of this paper is to fill in this gap. We develop a simple model in the spirit of second 
generation currency crises models developed by (Obstfled, 1996). The model describes a 
strategic game between governments and financial markets. Eurozone countries face a trade-
off as governments may either commit and implement restrictive fiscal policies or default on 
debt. The cost of the commitment strategy increases when interest rates increase or when the 
fiscal multipliers are high. This leaves the opportunity for speculators to drive the economy 
towards a bad equilibrium, forcing the government to renege its commitment. We introduce 
a source of uncertainty about the cost of default in the model. By this way, we may introduce 
the possibility that governments do not default although risk premiums on bond yield is high. 
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Introduction 
 
From 2011, EMU countries have engaged a strategy of frontloaded fiscal consolidation. 
Despite evidence that such a strategy could be self-defeating (Holland and Portes 2012) and 
detrimental to growth, fiscal stance has remained restrictive in 2012, in 2013 and it will still 
be in 2014. This strategy is clearly sub-optimal (see OFCE, IMK, & ECLM, 2012) regarding 
new evidence on the size of fiscal multipliers. 3 From there, the strategy of frontloaded fiscal 
consolidation may be justified either by a misperception of the size of fiscal multipliers4 or by 
a credibility argument. Some countries (mainly from the South of Europe: Greece, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal) faced a rapid surge in the risk premium on sovereign bond yields. 
Whereas spreads did not exceed 60 basis points in the pre-crisis period, they had started to 
rise moderately with the outbreak of the financial crisis. Then, a break occurred at the 
autumn 2009 after the newly elected Greek government revised strongly upward the deficit 
figures for 2009 and after the Gulf emirate of Dubai asked for moratorium on the debt of a 
public conglomerate. These news triggered a regime-switch as financial markets suddenly 
realized that a default on public debt might not be excluded Gibson et al. (2012). Therefore, 
they started to cast some doubt on the credibility of the Greek government to deal with the 
need to restore public finances sustainability. Contagion rapidly gained other EMU countries 
which then felt urged to reduce public deficits to show their commitment to fiscal 
sustainability. Fiscal consolidation was perceived as the only solution to enforce credibility 
and to step down the risk premium. Conversely, it was thought that delaying the adjustment 
would have led to an explosion of the spreads and eventually to the split up of the Eurozone.  
Credibility has yet not improved despite the measures taken ex-ante by governments to 
improve their fiscal position. Spreads have still increased in 2011 and 2012. Even if it is 
almost impossible to assess what would have been the development of spreads if countries 
had considered an alternative fiscal strategy, it remains that consolidation has not been a 
sufficient condition to ensure credibility. The deterioration of other macroeconomic 
fundamentals (notably the output gap) may also matter as less future growth resulting from 
harsh consolidation reduces the ability to repay debt in the future. Credibility and risks of 
default result from complex interactions where self-fulfilling prophecies or contagion effects 
also matter. The aim of the paper is then to provide a theoretical analysis of credibility and 
default in a model with multiple equilibria. Fundamentals matter but, self-fulfilling 
prophecies may drive up risk premium and force the government to default. 
Following the outbreak of the Greek crisis, literature on sovereign debt and risk of default has 
resurfaced. Empirical analyses have notably developed shedding new lights on the main 
determinants of interest rates spreads. It has been suggested that a reduction of the fiscal 
space (through changes in fiscal variables flows or stocks) have a positive impact on 
government bond yields, 5 imposing by this way discipline on governments (Schucknecht et 
al. 2009). But other fundamentals may also matter. External imbalances (Alessandrini et al. 
                                                          
3 Recent literature has indeed showed that fiscal multipliers depend on the macro-financial 
environment. They are higher when the unemployment rate is high and when a banking crisis occurs. 
See notably Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012); Corsetti et al. (2012); DeLong and Summers (2012); 
Hall (2009); Karras (2013).  
4 The IMF (see Blanchard & Leigh, 2013) has indeed recognised that fiscal multipliers had been 
underestimated. 
5 See Haugh et al. (2009) for a synthesis on the impact of increases of debt or deficit on the interest 
rates. 
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2012) or business cycles (Grandes 2007) have been found to have an impact of bond yields 
spreads. However, recent evidence points out that the dynamic of the sovereign spreads 
during the crisis is hardly explained by fundamentals. Substantial mispricing is often 
highlighted as notably emphasized by De Grauwe and Ji (2012) though estimated 
misalignments depend on the choice of the estimated model, the sample… (de Haan et al. 
2013). Two alternative interpretations may then be provided (Aizenman et al. 2013). 
Mispricing is either the result of multiple equilibria where financial markets have jumped 
from the “good” equilibrium to the “bad” equilibrium, or it may also mirror a future 
deterioration of fundamentals expected by investors. Yet, members of monetary union are 
notably more prone to liquidity squeeze as they are indebted in a money over which they do 
not have complete control (De Grauwe 2012). As financial markets are aware that these 
countries cannot force the central bank to act as a lender of last resort for public debt, they 
may be more incline to test the ability of members of monetary union to redeem their debt. 
These countries face the “original sin” problem emphasized by Eichengreen et al. (2005). 
Hence, the relation between sovereign debt spreads and fundamentals may be nonlinear 
reflecting changes in the mood of financial markets and notably the general risk pricing 
(Bernoth et al. 2006). Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011) illustrate for example the contagion 
effect by suggesting that the rise in the spread on Greek bonds has been passed through the 
sovereign debt spread for most EMU countries during the crisis. Finally Bruneau et al. (2012) 
suggest that the probability of default is a nonlinear function of fundamentals and driven by 
self-fulfilling speculation. 6 They highlight the market perception of risks influenced notably 
by the sovereign CDS market. The perception of risks would then be a key point for 
explaining sovereign spreads though in practice government defaults are extremely rare 
events for advanced economies (Buiter and Rahbari 2013). 
Yet, this literature has been mainly empirical and needs sound theoretical foundations. The 
aim of this paper is to fill in this gap. Amid the different features highlighted by the empirical 
literature, we consider that a model describing the determinants of sovereign debt spread 
should encompass the following characteristics: the role of macroeconomic fundamentals 
(not only fiscal position but also business cycle), risk pricing (related to risk aversion of 
market) and self-fulfilling prophecies. Some tentative have already been proposed. Early 
literature on sovereign debt default from Calvo (1988), Cole and Kehoe (1996) and Cole and 
Kehoe (2000) already emphasized that credibility matters and that the choice of default 
result from a strategic game. Some more recent papers also draw on exchange rate crises 
literature (Bruneau et al. 2012) or (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas 2011). The second generation 
currency crises models are notably well suited as they are based on the interactions between 
expectations of market participants and decisions made by the central bank regarding the peg 
(Obstfled, 1996) or (Sachs et al. 1996). Central banks face a trade-off between unemployment 
and devaluation. The incentive to exit the peg increases with the unemployment rate. 
Speculators are aware of this trade-off and may ask for higher interest rates to offset the risk 
of devaluation which raises the unemployment rate and triggers the collapse of the exchange 
rate regime. 
In the current context of a monetary union, Eurozone countries face the same kind of trade-
off. Governments may either commit and implement restrictive fiscal policies or default on 
debt. The cost of the commitment strategy increases when interest rates increase or when the 
fiscal multipliers are high. This leaves the opportunity for speculators to drive the economy 
                                                          
6 See also De Grauwe and Ji (2013). 
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towards a bad equilibrium in which the sovereign debt risk premium increases forcing the 
government to renege its commitment. The analogy with exchange rate crisis models is 
clearly made by De Grauwe and Ji (2014) who emphasize that speculative attacks occur on 
the bond market in monetary union while they would occur in the foreign exchange markets 
in fixed-exchange rate regimes like the EMS. The optimal decision of investors arises 
endogenously in the model (see Cornand et al. (2014) for another example), contrary to most 
second-generation models of crises. Compared to Sachs et al. (1996), we also introduce 
information asymmetries in the model considering that the cost of default is not perfectly 
known by financial markets or that information on public finances may be asymmetric. In 
this sense, signaling can have an impact on the equilibrium outcome as in Angeletos et al. 
(2006). By this way, we may introduce the possibility that governments do not default 
although risk premium on bond yield is high. 7 Then, the model is able to explain, through 
numerical simulations, why Greece has de facto defaulted on public debt (fundamentals were 
deteriorated) and why some other countries have been driven in the zone of increased risk 
without default (Spain or Italy for example).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model without asymmetric information is 
described in the first section. The introduction of information asymmetries is made in the 
second section. Numerical simulations are presented in the third section to see whether the 
model may fit with data on Greece and Italy. Section four concludes. The portfolio choice of 
investors is shortly described in appendix. 
A model of default on public debt with self-fulfilling prophecies 
 
We develop a simple static macroeconomic model, encompassing the effect of fiscal policy on 
economic activity and public debt dynamics. The model also takes into account the interest 
rates (including a risk premium – see Appendix I) effects on debt and economic dynamics. 
Besides, the policy-maker, here the government, has the choice to default partly on public 
debt.  
Consider an economy in which the output gap 𝑜𝑜 positively depends on the fiscal impulse 𝐹𝐹, 
interest rate and a random demand shock. The impact of fiscal policy depends on the size of 
the fiscal multiplier identified by the parameter 𝑘. The interest rate 𝑟 + 𝜙 – including the risk 
premium – has a negative effect on output gap.  
(1.1) 𝑜𝑜 = 𝑘.𝐹𝐹 − 𝛼(𝑟 + 𝜙) + 𝜇 
Debt dynamics depends on past debt including debt burden, cyclical component of taxes and 
public expenditures 𝜑. 𝑜𝑜, the fiscal impulse and the value of repudiated debt 𝑑. 𝑏−1 in case of 
default: 
(1.2) 𝑏 = (1 + 𝑟 + 𝜙)𝑏−1 − 𝜑. 𝑜𝑜 + 𝐹𝐹 − 𝑑. 𝑏−1 
                                                          
7 Which is not the case in a one-period model with rational expectations. Once the random shock has 
occurred, government and speculators may compute the cost of the commitment strategy and the cost 
of default and choose accordingly the optimal strategy. 
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We assume 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 1. It is supposed here that the haircut is chosen once the default is 
announced although history of defaults shows that it may be the result of a long bargaining 
between creditors and the debtor, which may last several years (Oosterlinck 2013). 
Based on the previous portfolio choice model, the risk premium is a positive function of 
default probability, expected discount and risk aversion: 
(1.3) 𝜙 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 .𝑑𝑒 + 𝜙� 
where 𝜙� = 1
𝜐
�
𝛾𝑛
2𝜎𝑅
2(1−𝛾𝑛)2 + (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑)2.𝜎𝑑𝑒2 �𝜔1 increases with risk aversion and uncertainty. 
The authorities’ objective is to minimize the following quadratic loss function: 
(1.4) 1
2
. �𝑜𝑜2 + 𝜆�𝑏 − 𝑏��2 + 𝛿.𝑑2� 
According to equation (1.4), the government’s objective is to stabilize output and public debt, 
reflecting notably existing fiscal rules. We may then think of the 60% target for EMU member 
countries. As inflation is not described in the model, it is not included in the objective 
function of government. It is otherwise supposed that government dislikes repudiation. 
Under discretion the government sets 𝐹𝐹 and 𝑑 to minimize (1.4) subject to equations (1.1), 
(1.2) and (1.3) and given the market’s expectation of the extent of default on public debt 𝑑𝑒. 
The solution is given by the following equation: 
(1.5) 𝑜𝑜 = −𝜆.𝑧.(1−𝜑.𝑘)
𝑘
𝐵, �𝑏 − 𝑏�� = 𝑧.𝐵 and 𝑑 = 𝜆.𝑧.𝑏−1
𝛿
𝐵 
where 𝑧 = 𝛿.𝑘2
𝛿.𝑘2+𝜆.𝑘2.𝑏𝑡−12 +𝜆.𝛿.(1−𝜑.𝑘)2  
and 𝐵 = �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 .𝑑𝑒 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘. 
Using (1.1) the fiscal impulse is then 𝐹𝐹 = −𝜆.𝑧.(1−𝜑.𝑘)
𝑘2
𝐵 + 𝛼�𝑟𝑡+𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.𝑑𝑒+𝜙��−𝜇
𝑘
 
The policymaker sets the fiscal impulse to minimize its loss function: a high level of debt, a 
high debt burden (enlarged by high risk premium) and positive shocks on the output gap 
imply negative fiscal impulses. Conversely, a negative shock on output gap implies a positive 
fiscal impulse to stabilize it. 
Using (1.5), the loss for government is  
(1.6) 𝐿𝑑 = 1
2
. 𝜆. 𝑧.𝐵2 
where the subscript d stands for “default” (or discretion regime). Under rational 
expectations, the following condition 𝑑𝑒 = 𝑑 is verified and from (1.5) we obtain: 
(1.7) 𝑑𝑒 = 𝜆.𝑧.𝑏−1
𝛿−𝜆.𝑧.𝑏−1.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘� ��𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙��. �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘� 
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Now suppose that the policymaker is able to commit to a no default solution. Then, 𝑑 = 0 and 
we have: 
(1.8) �𝑏 − 𝑏�� = ?̃?.𝐵 and 𝑜𝑜 = −𝜆.𝑧�.(1−𝜑.𝑘)
𝑘
𝐵 
where ?̃? = 𝑘2
𝑘2+𝜆.(1−𝜑.𝑘)2 
The corresponding loss, under the “commitment solution” is: 
(1.9) 𝐿𝑐 = 1
2
. 𝜆. ?̃?.𝐵 
The government always have an incentive to default, as ?̃?> 𝑧 since 𝜆.𝑘2.𝑏−12 > 0. Next, we 
assume that the government faces an additional fixed private cost 𝑐 > 0 when it defaults on 
its debt.  
Given the expected haircut (𝑑𝑒) on debt fixed on the financial markets, the government finds 
it optimal to default if and only if 𝐿𝑑 + 𝑐 < 𝐿𝑐 . Using (1.6) and (1.9) we get: 
(1.10) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 .𝑑𝑒 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 > 𝐾 
where 𝐾 = [2𝑐]1 2⁄ [𝜆(?̃? − 𝑧)]−1 2⁄ . 
 
 A default will then occur in equilibrium if: 
- inherited debt is sufficiently high relative to the debt target, 
- debt burden is sufficiently high, meaning notably that a restrictive monetary policy, 
by increasing the risk-free interest rate, increases the risk of default, 
- a sufficiently high negative shock on output gap occurs, especially when the fiscal 
multiplier is low, 
- risk aversion is sufficiently high, which would be translated in higher risk premium 
- expectations of default and are sufficiently high. 
Financial markets understand the temptation summarized by equation (1.10) and then 
rationally determine expectations of default. The left hand-side on the inequality depends on 
the fundamentals (debt, interest rate and the random shock), on the probability of default, 
the expected haircut and risk-aversion.  
A rational equilibrium with no expectation of default (𝑑𝑒 = 0) may be reached if and only if: 
(1.11) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 ≤ 𝐾 
 
When condition (1.11) is not satisfied, it is never rational not to expect a default. Combining 
equations (1.7) and (1.10), we may identify a second condition where agents may expect a 
default. It is given by: 
(1.12) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 > 𝐾1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘� 
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where 𝑛 = 𝜆.𝑧.𝑏−1
𝛿−𝜆.𝑧.𝑏−1.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘� 
Thus 𝐾
1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘� and 𝐾 defines two thresholds value that may illustrate three cases8 
according to the fundamentals. These three areas are illustrated in figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1. Level of fundamentals and multiple equilibria. 
 
On the left hand side (below 𝐾
1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘�), fundamentals (inherited debt, debt burden and 
shock) are sound. It would not be rational to expect a positive probability to default since no 
default will occur whatever agents expected. The government enjoys full credibility. This may 
characterize the situation of Germany. On the right hand side (above 𝐾), fundamentals are 
deteriorated and the government will always default whatever is the expected haircut. The 
Government enjoys no credibility at all, as it may have been the case for the Greek 
government in the recent sovereign debt crisis. Once the public information about the true 
value of the public deficit was revealed, fundamentals have exceeded the threshold and 
default has become unavoidable. 
Finally, for levels of fundamentals in the range � 𝐾
1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘� ;𝐾�, there are multiple 
equilibria. If agents do not expect default (𝑑𝑒 = 0), no default occurs (the good equilibria). If 
financial markets expect a default, then the size of default is given by 
𝑑𝑒 = 𝜆.𝑧.𝑏−1
𝛿−𝜆.𝑧.𝑏−1.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘� ��𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙��. �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘� and the default will be 
validated by the policymaker (the bad equilibria). Credibility of the government is partial and 
depends on expectations. Default, in this intermediary area result from self-fulfilling 
prophecies. 
 
The partition of the state space depends on the value of K, which increases with the cost of 
default, the impact of interest rate and fiscal impulses on the output gap, the respective 
weights of public debt and haircut in the loss function of the government. Then for higher 
cost of default, the area of full credibility increases and the zone where the government has 
no credibility is moved to the right. Nonetheless, it must also be noted that the area of partial 
                                                          
8 There is then a clear connection with the cases highlighted by (Sachs et al. 1996). 
Full Credibility Partial Credibility No Credibility 
𝐾1 + 𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 . �𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑘� 𝐾  
�𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙�𝑡𝑡� �𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑘  
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credibility widens meaning that the risk of multiple equilibria becomes larger. Concerning 
the value of fiscal multiplier, it can be shown that K decreases with k. Then, in time of crisis, 
recent evidence showing that fiscal multiplier are higher imply that the government may lose 
credibility and enter the intermediate area where expectations of defaults can force the 
government to default on public debt even if the fundamentals have not deteriorated. This 
model is then insightful to illustrate the role of self-fulfilling prophecies in driving the 
government into default. It may explain why in the recent crisis, some countries have enjoyed 
full credibility (fundamentals were sound) or why sovereign risk premium have emerged 
pushing countries into the partial or no credibility area.  
Finally, it must be stressed that once the shock is revealed here, there is no more uncertainty. 
Financial markets are fully aware of fundamentals and of the trade-off faced by government. 
If they expect capital losses, 𝑑𝑒 > 0, the rational solution leads to a default on public debt. 
Yet, the model may not fully capture the different situations of Eurozone countries during the 
recent crisis since risk premium have sometimes strongly increased (for Spain or Italy for 
instance) without triggering a default. To consider these cases, we extend the model in two 
ways. First, we suppose that the cost of default is unknown and may be assessed differently 
by the government and financial markets. Second, asymmetric information on the value of 
debt is introduced. 
Sovereign default and government’s credibility with information 
asymmetries 
 
Though, the model sketched above highlights interesting features of sovereign default, it may 
not capture all the situations observed in reality. There are notably periods of high risk 
premium which are not followed by default (Cottarelli et al. 2010). Yet, the model does not 
account for this possibility of false signals or “type I error” where the null hypothesis of “no 
default” is true but rejected. In the recent sovereign debt crisis, the sovereign debt spreads 
have suddenly and strongly increased for Spain or Italy but default did not occur so far and 
spreads have now slowly vanished. Besides, situation where default is not expected – the 
warning signal has not been sent – but occurs (as for a “type II error”). The model is then 
extended through the introduction of uncertainty. Then, markets may suddenly shift from 
equilibrium with full credibility to equilibrium with partial credibility, forcing the 
government to default when economy is in the partial credibility zone. The introduction of 
uncertainty may indeed fit better with reality notably because the cost of default is certainly 
unknown resulting from several complex factors.  
First, the access to international capital markets may be restricted for a significant period in 
case of default. This period of restricted access to financial markets is certainly related to the 
time needed to resolve public debt default. Pitchford and Wright (2013) reminds that it takes 
on average 6-8 years to restructure public debt. The government will also suffer from a loss of 
credibility and may also incur international sanctions (trade restrictions or freezing assets as 
emphasized by Pitchford & Wright, 20139). Finally, costs of default may become high notably 
if the default triggers a banking crisis forcing the government to bail-out the banking sector. 
Those costs may not be proportional to the extent of the default or to any other 
                                                          
9 It has yet been extremely rare. 
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macroeconomic variable. Conversely, governments have indeed always the ability to increase 
taxes or cut public expenditures to honour its debt. But the needed consolidation may not be 
socially or politically accepted as emphasized by (Buiter and Rahbari 2013) who introduce 
the maximum feasible primary surplus, reflecting economic, socially and political limits to 
consolidation measures. There is then a trade-off between economic, social and political costs 
of consolidation and the cost of default. This trade-off is highly uncertain as neither the social 
or political cost of consolidation, nor the costs in terms of reputation are observable. We will 
next consider the case where the cost of default is precisely known by the government only as 
default is eventually a political choice made by the government. Another source of 
uncertainty during the crisis was also related to the level of public debt. The Greek crisis has 
illustrated that public debt could be significantly revised upward. Then, we propose an 
extension of the model to account for uncertainty on the value of debt. Financial markets may 
indeed not always have full information when forming their forecasts. Definitive figures for 
debt at year (t) are only revealed at the beginning of year (t+1) and even if some intermediary 
information is provided during the year, surprises may occur leading to a new revised 
assessment on the risk of default. 
 
The case of unknown default 
 
Let’s consider a situation where the cost of default is unknown and written in the following 
way: 
?̂? = 𝑐 + Θ 
where Θ is the random shock on the cost of default. We suppose hereafter that 𝐸(Θ) = 0. The 
cost of default for the government is still c, whereas it is now ?̂? for the financial markets . 
Hence, we assume here that the cost of default is fixed for the government and may jump to 
higher or lower levels for financial markets. Shocks on the assessment of cost of default may 
well capture some features of the recent financial crisis. Before the outbreak of the Greek 
crisis, default was not considered as an option and financial markets suddenly realized that it 
was a possibility and that Eurozone countries were more prone to liquidity crises (De Grauwe 
and Ji 2012). This new assessment of default also certainly embraced the exit cost of euro 
area. It may have been infinite before 2010 and has turned to a finite value as some European 
political leaders openly evoked the possibility for EMU countries to split up. 
The resolution of the model is unchanged and default conditions do not change for the 
government, but do change for financial markets. Now financial markets always expect a 
default if 
(2.1) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 .𝑑𝑒 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 > 𝐾� 
where 𝐾� = [2?̂?]1 2⁄ [𝜆(?̃? − 𝑧)]−1 2⁄  
 
Equations (1.11) and (1.12), defining the thresholds are rewritten so that, financial markets 
grant no credibility to government when fundamentals lie above 𝐾�: 
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(2.2) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 > 𝐾� 
 
Credibility is full – expected haircut is null (𝑑𝑒 = 0) – for financial markets when: 
(2.3) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 < 𝐾� 1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏𝑡−1+𝛼𝑘� 
As before, credibility is partial in the intermediary area and risk premium may either be 
positive or null.  
Starting from this, two cases deserve attention according to the difference in the cost of 
default. Considering a negative shock on the cost of default for financial markets, we would 
have 𝑐 > ?̂?. This may result from contagion effect or from a political shock (see Cole and 
Kehoe 1996). In the case of contagion, the cost of default is reassessed because a default has 
been observed in a country sharing some common troubles. The shock may result from a 
change of government if the newly elected government has call for a debt restructuration 
during the political campaign. A first situation emerges where the government would remain 
in the full credibility area whereas financial markets expecting a lower cost of default are in 
the partial credibility area. This situation may arise if (see figure 2):  
𝐾�
1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘� ≤ �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 ≤ 𝐾1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘�,  
 
In such a situation, it is never optimal for the government to default. The loss of the 
government is indeed lower when not defaulting than when defaulting. Fundamentals are not 
sufficiently “deteriorated” to force the government to default, but as the expected cost of 
default is weaker for financial markets, they would wrongly expect a default and send a false 
signal, increasing the risk premium. Spain and Italy have certainly been in such a situation 
during the sovereign debt crisis. The outbreak of the Greek crisis has triggered a shock in the 
expectation of default, a possibility that was overlooked before and became suddenly 
possible. Financial markets have then underestimated the cost of default relative to the 
government’s assessment of default. This would explain why sovereign spread had risen 
although the Spanish government did not consider the opportunity to default. 
 
Full Credibility Partial Credibility No Credibility 
𝐾1 + 𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 . �𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑘� 
𝐾
 𝐾
� 𝐾�1 + 𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 �𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑘� 
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Figure 2. Risk premium and no default. 
 
A second situation arises when: 
(2.4) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 ≥ 𝐾� 
 
In that case, the market always expects default, which occurs as soon as: 
(2.5) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 > 𝐾1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏𝑡−1+𝛼𝑘�.  
 
Here the government is partially credible but forced into default sooner when financial 
markets consider that the cost of default is weak. The range of multiple equilibria has been 
consequently reduced, meaning that, for the same value of fundamentals, the possibility that 
financial markets systematically expect default is increased. Default would occur more 
frequently or rapidly since financial investors consider that the cost of default is weaker. Let’s 
suppose for example that we start from a situation of sound macroeconomic fundamentals so 
that the government has no incentive to default and default is not expected by financial 
markets. Consider then the occurrence of a strong adverse shock deteriorating the economic 
situation so that the government is now in the partial credibility area. But, with  ?̂? < 𝑐 the 
governement has lost its credibility for financial investors and lies is the “no credibility” area. 
Default becomes the optimal solution since it is expected by financial markets. The default 
scenario may become certain if at the same time, the adverse shock push fundemandals such 
that condition (2.4) is met. 
Alternatively, we may also consider the polar case where 𝑐 < ?̂? so that 𝐾 < 𝐾�. The expected 
cost of default is higher for financial markets than for financial markets. In such a situation, a 
default may occur even if it is not expected by financial markets. Here, financial markets have 
failed to send the warning signal. There is no risk premium but the value of fundamentals for 
which the government considers that it is preferable to default is so low that it chooses to 
default. This situation arises for:  
(2.6) 𝐾 < 𝐾�
1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘�  
It would represent a situation where the financial investors attribute a very high value to the 
public default. It is then not rational to ask for a risk premium. But if the real cost of default 
is significantly lower, the government may choose to. Actually, history of default shows that 
financial markets may not expect default even if fundamentals are deteriorated for 
governments.  
 
The case of asymmetric information on public finances 
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This situation may be alternatively captured by introducing uncertainty on the value of debt. 
Instead of considering that the cost of default is estimated differently, we suppose that 
information on the situation of public finances is asymmetric so that only the government 
knows perfectly and timely the amount of public debt. Public information on debt is revealed 
with a lag and may then trigger information surprises if debt is higher (or lower) than 
expected. The expected value of public debt is such that:  
𝑏−1� = 𝑏 + Θ 
 
with Θ depending on private information collected by investors on public debt. For the sake 
of simplicity, we suppose that Θ is a random shock. Equations (1.11) and (1.12), defining the 
thresholds are rewritten with 𝑏−1�  . Starting from this, the default occurs if: 
(2.7) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 > 𝐾  
whereas: 
(2.8) �𝑏−1� − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1� + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 < 𝐾  
or  
(2.9) �𝑏−1� − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1� + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 < 𝐾1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘�  
Here, the default had not been expected, so that risk premium was null. Given the value of 
public debt, which is known precisely and timely by the government only, it is optimal to 
default. According to the private information, the market’s perception was that government 
was fully credible or partially credible. Financial markets are then surprised by default. It 
may yet be acknowledged that this situation may not be usual as the default is often triggered 
following a period of panic where risk premium reaches a peak. In the Greek crisis, the 
revelation on the deficits in October 2009 by the newly elected government of Georgios 
Papandréou has changed financial markets’ perception on the ability of the government to 
meet its commitments so that the situation described above may fit with this reality. 
The model can now account for this if the news is interpreted as a signal (random shock) 
increasing 𝑏−1� . Before the announcement, the assessment made by financial markets on 
public debt was such that 𝑏−1� < 𝑏, with b only known by the government and with condition 
(2.9) fulfilled and with: 
(2.10) �𝑏−1 − 𝑏�� + �𝑟 + 𝜙�� �𝑏−1 + 𝛼𝑘� − 𝜇𝑘 > 𝐾1+𝑛.𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.�𝑏−1+𝛼𝑘� 
  
The news suddenly changed the market’s perception and credibility became partial. It might 
even be argued that public debt has reached a level such that Greek government had directly 
jumped to the “no credibility” area. It was clear now that it was insolvent and default was the 
only option. The sudden increase in the risk premium only reflected this situation.  
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Sovereign default and governments’ credibility in the euro area: some 
illustrations  
 
Finally, we provide numerical illustrations of the model emphasizing notably the dynamic of 
credibility, given fundamentals and given a consistent parametrization. To this end, the 
model is calibrated with Greek and Italian data. The aim is notably to assess whether the 
model may provide insightful explanations of the recent episode of sovereign crisis in the 
euro area.  
 
When did Greece lose credibility? 
 
The two situations described by the theoretical model above may be illustrated with 
numerical simulations. The aim is notably to assess the dynamic of government’s credibility 
according to the level of public debt or the estimated cost of default. The numerical 
application is first drawn on the Greek data. Values of the parameters are presented in table 1 
below. 
Table 1. Calibration  
𝜆 1 
𝛿 4 
𝛼 0.93 
𝜑 0.43 
𝑘 1 
𝑏� 1.2 
𝜇 0 
 
We assume that the government puts the same relative weight on stabilising activity and 
achieving the debt target (𝜆 = 1), but that it is reluctant to implement any haircut on the debt (𝛿 = 4). For the sensitivity of the output gap to the real interest rate we retain the value 0.93 
estimated by Coenen and Wieland (2005) for the euro area. The sensitivity of taxes to activity 
comes from European Commission (2005), and the fiscal multiplier is set to 1 following 
Blanchard and Leigh (2013). The past debt is the Maastricht debt given by OECD economic 
outlook, and the target debt is the level of debt that Greece engaged to achieve in 2020 when 
dealing financial help with the IMF and eurozone countries in 2010. In the case of Greece, 
news about the situation of public finances has led to a sudden increase in public debt after 
2010. This increase may have been seen as a signal for financial markets. New information 
were provided, which modify the perception of the risk of default and of the credibility of the 
Greek government. OECD database clearly shows that debt was revised upward after 2010. In 
the Economic Outlook (EO thereafter) released in November 2010 (EO88), public debt for 
2010 was estimated to amount to 96 % of GDP. One year after, in the EO90 database, public 
debt was at 107.4 %. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 stems from (Camba-méndez and Serwa 2014), who estimate the 
probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD) as perceived by financial markets 
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for several euro area countries. For sake of simplicity, we have supposed that 𝜇 = 0 since we 
don’t know the size of shocks that hit the Greek economy during the crisis. 
A first way to compute 𝜙� would be 𝜙� = 𝜙 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 .𝑑𝑒. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 can be computed from CDS with 
an assumption on 𝑑𝑒. But as CDS may overestimate default probability during the crisis (see 
Aizenman et al. 2013), we have to make another assumption to compute 𝜙�. For sake of 
simplicity, risk premium is assumed to be half the difference between the Greek 10 year 
interest rate and the German rate.  
Chart 1a and 1b shows the dynamics of fundamentals and, for given thresholds corresponding 
to conditions (1.11) and (1.12). They indicate whether the government is fully credible, 
partially credible or has no credibility, for an expected cost of default of 10% of GDP. Yet, 
fundamentals and thresholds depend on public debt at time (t-1) and it appears that the 
upward revision of public debt has led Greece to the partial credibility area (chart 1b) 
whereas it would not have been the case if debt figures had not been revised upward (chart 
1a). It may be observed that with this set of parameters, Greece would have entered relatively 
later in the partial credibility area. Yet, the calibration is based on relative prudent 
hypotheses as Greece has been hit by negative shocks, which is not taken into account here. 
The size of fiscal multiplier may also be above unity. We should also stress that with our 
calibration, we show that Greece would lose all credibility at the end of 2011 (2011-Q3), 
precisely at the time when the implicit default on debt occurred.  
Besides, it may then be shown that the area of partial credibility gets larger with the cost of 
default. At the same time, fundamentals have to be worse and worse for the government to 
enter in it (chart 2). Then for a lower expected cost of default, the higher is public debt (or the 
more deteriorated are fundamentals) the more rapidly do governments fall in partial 
credibility or no credibility areas. In this sense, uncertainty on the cost of default, and low 
market expectations on it may have triggered the default. Considering the situation of Greece 
at the beginning of 2011, the model’s simulations highlight that Greece would have been in 
the partial credibility zone if the cost of default had been below 5% of GDP. It may also be 
shown that the partial credibility area becomes larger when the probability of default 
increases (chart 3). These expectations may have pushed the market to speculate against 
Greek debt via the CDS market. As the partial credibility area is reached more rapidly when 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 is higher, financial markets may have expected higher default probability, pushing 
Greece in the partial area or the default area, which would have triggered the default in 2012. 
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Chart 1a. Fundamentals (before revision) and credibility in Greece between 2010 and 2012 
 
Sources: author’s calculations, OECD EO88, Camba-méndez and Serwa (2014). 
Note: we assume c=10% of GDP 
Chart 1b. Fundamentals (after revision) and credibility in Greece between 2010 and 2012 
 
Sources: author’s calculations, OECD EO93, Camba-méndez and Serwa (2014). 
Note: we assume c=10% of GDP 
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Chart 2. Credibility areas for Greece and cost of default in 2011Q1 
 
Source: author’s calculations, Camba-méndez and Serwa (2014) 
 
Chart 3. Credibility areas for Greece and probability of default in 2011Q1 
 
Source: author’s calculations, Camba-méndez and Serwa (2014) 
Note: we assume c=10% of GDP 
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The cost of default and the Italian credibility 
Finally, the model may also help to understand at which conditions Italy (or Spain, Ireland or 
Portugal) has become partially credible. As emphasized in the theoretical model developed 
above, it may be the consequence of a reduction in the estimated cost of default. Then, we 
determine the area of full partial and no credibility according to the cost of default as in chart 
3. To make the reading of the chart easier, we only consider the cost estimated by financial 
markets. Then, in the partial credibility area, a risk premium may appear but it will not 
automatically trigger a default if the cost of default for government is higher. 
The calibration of the model is the same as in table 1. Fiscal multiplier is supposed to be equal 
to 1 and the role of macroeconomic shocks is overlooked. The only difference stem from 
macroeconomic fundamentals and more precisely from the level of public debt. As for 
Greece, the partial credibility area widens for higher cost of default. But at the same time, 
fundamentals should be more deteriorated to enter this area. Consider the level of public 
debt in 2010, Italy would have been in the partial credibility area for a cost of default between 
4% and 5% of GDP (chart 4). With higher public debt, as in 2013, partial credibility area 
would start for a cost of default of 6 %. Here it must be stressed that a small deterioration of 
fundamentals either through an increase in debt or through a negative shock hitting the 
economy, would push Italy to the area where it has no credibility for financial markets. A risk 
premium would then appear. Nonetheless, the default would not automatically occur, as 
emphasized in the theoretical model with asymmetric information, since the cost of default 
for the government may be higher. This simple numerical exercise helps to highlight the main 
feature of the model and shows that for consistent hypotheses regarding the macroeconomic 
parameter, the model may replicate what has been observed in during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. 
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Chart 4. Credibility areas for Italy and cost of default  
 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have developed a simple analytical model to illustrate the interconnections 
between fundamentals, risk premium on sovereign debt and risk of default. The model is 
inspired by exchange rate crises models of Obstfled (1996) and Sachs et al. (1996) and 
adapted to a situation where government decide rationally to default or not taking into 
account the risk premium, the output gap and the cost of implementing restrictive fiscal 
policy. The situation of some European countries during the recent sovereign debt crisis is 
clearly well illustrated by this kind of models suggesting that self-fulfilling prophecies may 
force the government to default. Here, it is worth reminding that default is always and finally 
the consequence of a political choice where the government face a trade-off between 
implementing more austerity to reduce public debt or defaulting. In situations where 
fundamentals are deteriorated, either because the debt burden has increased, the risk 
aversion of financial markets have increased or a negative shocks has occurred, the credibility 
of the government may decrease and become partial. There are then multiple equilibria and 
the government is forced to default if this is the situation expected by financial markets. This 
kind of vicious circle is clearly representative of what occurred for European countries in the 
recent period. Yet, default is costly. The reputation of government may seriously be 
undermined in case of default. The access to financial markets funding may be restricted for a 
sustained period. Besides, the threshold over which austerity measures become socially 
unsustainable is clearly unknown. The ability to raise taxes or to cut spending is part of the 
trade-off but is uncertain and can only be expected. There is then no reason that expectation 
of financial investors matches with the supposed cost of default used by the government 
when the rational choice is made. By the same way, pubic debt is not always perfectly (in real 
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time) known by financial markets. The government has then certainly private information on 
the real value of debt up to a certain moment when signals are sent to give information on the 
true value of debt. This situation may then change financial market’s perception on 
credibility. The model is then extended to account for asymmetric information on the cost 
default or on public debt. Multiple situations may occur, enriching the conclusions of the 
model of Sachs et al. (1996) as we illustrate cases where financial markets expect default and 
capital losses whereas no default occurs since the cost of default is high for government and 
the value of fundamentals is good enough so that the government does not find it optimal to 
default. In the same way, news on fundamentals – signals – on public debt may suddenly 
drive fundamentals on area where credibility is partial and where multiple equilibria arise. 
Clearly, considering asymmetric information opens new issues regarding the possibility to 
influence private expectations of the cost of default. There is an incentive to convince 
financial markets that the cost of default is high. Besides, the role of institutions clearly 
matters. In the European context, the sovereign spreads were certainly fuelled by the debate 
on a possible exit of countries from the monetary union. The adoption of the TSCG has 
contributed to reinforce the viability of EMU. The role of the ECB and the announcement of 
the OMT have probably played an even greater role to lessen the sovereign spreads. By 
convincing the financial markets that it would stand ready to intervene to purchase public 
debt, it has clearly sent a signal that default was less likely and more costly as it would have 
denied the ability of government to benefit from the support of the central bank. More 
research is yet needed to formalize more thoroughly this issue. 
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Appendix I. A model of portfolio choice with default 
 
We develop a model to describe the main components of the risk premium. This is a simple 
model of portfolio choices where investors allocate their wealth between a risk-free asset and 
a risky asset which is a domestic asset issued by the government10. It takes into account risk 
aversion and a probability that the government default on public debt. Such kind of models 
can be based on term structure models of interest rates to account for long maturity 
issuances. A general model of term structure is developed following Shiller (1979), and 
completed with a portfolio choice model. 
The expected one-period holding yield 𝐻𝑡𝑛 of a risky asset, a bond, maturing in n periods, 
given by equation (A.1) is equal to expected price of the bond at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1, which amounts to 
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑛−1 with a probability 1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 that the government do not default on debt, and amounts 
to the expected value of the bond if the government defaults at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1, approximated by (1 − 𝑑𝑒)𝑃𝑡𝑛 plus a coupon payment 𝐶 at the end of the period, minus the price of the bond at 
time t, divided by the 𝑃𝑡𝑛. We assume that 𝑑𝑒 is the expected capital loss – or discount – on 
the bond price and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 is with the probability of default. Both terms are supposed to be 
exogenous for individual investors. It is clear that the capital loss is not known a priori. In the 
case of sovereign default, once it is announced by the government, an open discussion is 
generally opened between the borrower and its creditor to fix the amount of the discounted 
payment11. The exogeneity of the probability of default may be justified either by the 
atomistic weight of an individual investor or by the fact that this probability simply reflects 
the historical probability of default, which is very low for advanced economies.  
(A.1) 𝐻𝑡𝑛 = 𝐶+(1−𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑).�𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1𝑛−1�+𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑.(1−𝑑𝑒)𝑃𝑡𝑛−𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑃𝑡𝑛  
The yield to maturity 𝑅𝑡𝑛 on an n-period bond is determined by the requirement that the price 
𝑃𝑡
𝑛of the bond is the present value of coupons and principal discounted by 𝑅𝑡𝑛: 
(A.2) 𝑃𝑡𝑛 = 𝐶𝑅𝑡𝑛 + 𝑅𝑡𝑛−𝐶𝑅𝑡𝑛.(1+𝑅𝑡𝑛)𝑛 
Substituting (A.2) in (A.1), linearizing around 𝐶 = 𝑅𝑡𝑛 = 𝑅𝑡+1𝑛−1 = 𝑅� and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑��������, 
simplifying and rearranging gives: 
(A.3) 𝐻𝑡𝑛 = 𝑅𝑡𝑛−𝛾𝑛.𝐸𝑡𝑅𝑡+1𝑛1−𝛾𝑛 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 .𝑑𝑡+1𝑒  
With 𝛾𝑛 = 𝛾� 1−𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑑����������𝛾�1−𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑑����������+𝑅��−𝛾𝑛−1�1−𝛾𝑛  and 𝛾 = 11+𝑅�. 
𝐸𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑛  is the expected yield to maturity at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1, with variance 𝜎𝑅2. The investor divides 
his investment fund into fractions 𝜔1 which is allocated to the purchase of long-term risky 
bonds and 𝜔2 allocated to the purchase of risk-free short-term bonds that pay 𝑟𝑡. The 
expected return of its portfolio has mean: 
                                                          
10 Such an approach is close to Bernoth et al. (2006). 
11 It may also be noticed that sovereign default are not ruled out by a supranational authority or court 
having the ability to resolve failing government and even less to proceed to liquidation. Then, the 
amount of capital losses may always be disputed. 
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(A.4) 𝜌𝑡 = 𝜔1(1 + 𝐻𝑡) + 𝜔2(1 + 𝑟𝑡) 
And variance: 
(A.5) 𝑆𝑡2 = 𝜔1 � 𝛾𝑛2𝜎𝑅2(1−𝛾𝑛)2 + (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑)2.𝜎𝑑𝑒2 � 
The risk of the portfolio notably depends only positively on the probability of default and on 
𝜎𝑑𝑒
2 , that can be viewed as an indicator of the uncertainty around the amount of capital loss in 
case of default. For sake of simplicity we assume that 𝑅𝑡+1𝑛  and  𝑑𝑡+1𝑒  are not correlated but 
this hypothesis shall be discussed: in case of default, the price of the bond would fall around (1 − 𝑑𝑒)𝑃𝑡𝑛 and the yield to maturity would go up. In the worst case, (A.5) would then 
underestimate the variance of the expected return of the portfolio. 
Assume the existence of a utility function 𝑈 that orders the risk-averse investor’s preferences 
according to the values of the couple (𝜌𝑡 ,𝑆𝑡2). The optimal choice for 𝜔 is obtained by 
maximising 𝑈(𝜌𝑡 ,𝑆𝑡2) under the constraint 𝜔1 + 𝜔2 = 1. First order conditions give: 
(A.6) 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
(1 + 𝑟𝑡) = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 (1 + 𝐻𝑡) + 2 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑆2 𝜔1. � 𝛾𝑛2𝜎𝑅2(1−𝛾𝑛)2 + (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑)2.𝜎𝑑𝑒2 � 
and 
(A.7) 𝜔1 + 𝜔2 = 1 
The optimal share of long-term risky bonds is then: 
(A.8) 𝜔1 = � 𝜐(1−𝛾𝑛)2𝛾𝑛2𝜎𝑅2+(1−𝛾𝑛)2.(𝑃𝑟𝑃𝑏𝑑)2.𝜎𝑑𝑒2 � [𝐻𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡]  
with 𝜐 = −1
2
𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕⁄
𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝑆2⁄
 
For 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝑆2
< 0, the investor is risk-averse as utility decreases when the risk of the portfolio 
increases. The share of the risky asset increases with the return of the risky asset and 
decreases, for risk-averse investor, with the risk of the risky asset, the probability of default 
and the variance of the capital loss. The yield to maturity on the risky bond is then given by: 
(A.9) 𝑅𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾𝑛)[𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑡] + 𝛾𝑛.𝑅𝑡+1  
with 𝜙𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 .𝑑𝑡+1𝑒 + 1𝜐 � 𝛾𝑛2𝜎𝑅2(1−𝛾𝑛)2 + (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑)2.𝜎𝑑𝑒2 �𝜔1 
Let’s consider now that, at the market equilibrium for the bond asset, demand by investors is 
equal to supply of bond. For sake of simplicity, we may suppose the behaviour of a 
representative investor whose wealth-to-GDP is w. The demand for the government bond – 
the risky asset here – is simply : 𝜔1𝑤. The total debt-to-GDP ratio is debt is given by b, so 
that the risk premium is finally given by : 
(A.10) 𝜙𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑 .𝑑𝑡+1𝑒 + 1𝜐 � 𝛾𝑛2𝜎𝑅2(1−𝛾𝑛)2 + (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑑)2.𝜎𝑑𝑒2 � 𝑏𝑤 
Here it only adds the fact that risk premium also depend on the debt-to-GDP ratio. Iterating 
(A.9) through the future, it gives: 
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(A.11) 𝑅𝑡 = 1−𝛾1−𝛾𝑛 ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐸𝑡�𝑟𝑡+𝑗 + 𝜙𝑡+𝑗�𝑛−1𝑗=0  
The long-term risky bond yield to maturity is equal to a weighted sum of expected future 
short-term interest rates and a risk premium that depends on the degree of risk aversion, the 
volatility on the risky bond market, a probability that the government will default in the 
future and the expected capital loss in case of default. If investors are risk neutral, then the 
premium only depends on the default and the expected discount. If expected premium and 
expected short term rate are constant, then equation (A.11) simply becomes 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑡. 
 
